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RAFAEL A. DECLET, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
On October 26, 1996, before 57,000 ecstatic fans at Yankee Stadium
and millions more across the country on television, the New York
Yankees defeated the Atlanta Braves 3-2 to win their 23rd World Series,
four games to two.' The win marked the end of an 18-year World Series
drought for the Yankees, and three days later 3.5 million New Yorkers
flocked to lower Broadway's Canyon of Heroes to fete their team with
ticker tape.2 New Yorkers were even ebullient enough to cheer the usu-
ally misprized Yankee owner, George M. Steinbrenner III, as he was
awarded a proclamation from Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani declaring the
day New York Yankee Day.
But under the din of New York's celebrations, tensions over the
Yankees's future in the Bronx remained high.4 Citing concerns about
the profitability of the outmoded Yankee Stadium and fan perceptions
of crime in the surrounding Bronx neighborhoods, Steinbrenner contin-
ues to hint that he will seek a new, more favorable locale for the
* J.D., cum laude, St. John's University School of Law, 1997; B.A., Lehman College of the
City University of New York, 1994. Law Clerk to the Honorable Carmen Beauchamp
Ciparick, Associate Judge of the New York Court of Appeals. Thanks are due to Dr. Patrick
J. Rohan, Dean Emeritus and Professor of Law at St. John's Law School, for his instructive
suggestions while this article was in its formative stages. Love and thanks to my wife, Jessica
S. Declet, for her help and support in writing this article.
1. Michael Hirsley, Low Series Ratings Are Plenty High for Fox, CM. TRIu., Nov. 1, 1996,
at 6; N.R. Kleinfeld, Comeback is Complete: Yanks Win the Series, N.Y. Tiaras, Oct. 27, 1996,
§ 1, at 1.
2. N.R. Kleinfeld, A Parade of Pride in Yankee Triumph, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1996, at Al.
3. Id.
4. See Michael 0. Allen, Mayor Sez No to Yank Grab, N.Y. DAiLY NEWs, Nov. 11, 1996,
at 10; New York's Baseball Mania: Out of Bounds?, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 2, 1996, at 28
(hereinafter "Out of Bounds"); Phil Plentz, Series Propels Yanks' Record Financial Year. Rev-
enues Top $100 Million Mark- Stadium, TV Deal Limit Future Gains, CRAIN's N.Y. Bus., Oct.
21, 1996, at 1; Tim Sullivan, World Series Right at Home in New York, CEnCArNAI ENQUIRER,
Oct. 20, 1996, at C1.
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Yankees, in New York or elsewhere, upon the expiration of the
Yankees's current stadium lease in 2002.1 In response, some commenta-
tors and local elected officials have proposed that if Steinbrenner cannot
be persuaded through negotiations to keep the Yankees in New York,
then New York City or New York State should force the issue by exercis-
ing their powers of eminent domain to condemn the franchise.6
This paper examines the feasibility of a state condemnation of the
Yankees. Part I provides an introduction to the issues, and sketches out
a history of New York City's relationships with baseball and the
Yankees. Part II discusses relevant aspects of the law of eminent do-
main. Part III addresses some of the legal difficulties associated with the
taking of a franchise, including antitrust law, the commerce clause, and
the potential problem of an "anticipatory flight" by the Yankees. Part
IV concludes that the State Legislature should quickly pass the New
York State Sports Fan Protection Act, and should not hesitate to con-
demn the team if it seems prudent or necessary.
A. Baseball and New York
Despite the enormous and continuing changes to the face of Ameri-
can culture since Casey struck out in Mudville, baseball retains its pride
of place as the national pastime.7 In 1996, some sixty million fans at-
tended major league baseball (hereinafter "MLB") games, more than
twice as many as patronized any other professional sport.' Many mil-
lions more enjoyed baseball on television or cable, comprising a wide
and extremely valuable audience.9
5. See Out of Bounds, supra note 4, at 28; Plentz, supra note 4, at 1.
6. Allen, supra note 4, at 10; Richard L. Brodsky, To Keep Yankees, Eminent Domain
Makes Sense, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 28, 1996, § 4, at 12; Karen Freifeld, Safe at Home: Bill Would
Keep Yanks in Bronx, NEWSDAY (Queens Ed.), Apr. 10, 1996, at A4; Out of Bounds, supra
note 4, at 28. See proposed New York State Sports Fan Protection Act, A.B. 684,220th Gen'l
Assembly, 1997-1998 Reg. Sess. (1997) (providing for creation of a New York Sports Facilities
Authority with power to condemn state-supported sports facilities and/or franchises).
7. On the history of baseball, see generally CHARLES C. ALEXANDER, OUR GAME: AN
AMERICAN BASEBALL HISTORY (1991); BENJAMIN G. RADER, BASEBALL: A HISTORY OF
AMERICA'S GAME (1992); DAVID VoioT, BASEBALU AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY (1987).
8. David Leonhardt, Baseball's Slump Is Far from Over, Bus. WK., Nov. 4, 1996, at 82.
Another 33 million fans patronized the 171 minor league teams. Notwithstanding baseball's
continuing lead in attendance over other professional sports, MLB's attendance is down some
15% from its level before the 1994-95 players' strike.
9. The networks shelled out $1.7 billion for five years of broadcast rights beginning in
1995. Stephen Baker & David Greising, The Home Run Baseball Badly Needs?, Bus. WK.,
Oct. 28, 1996, at 55.
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New Yorkers pride themselves on living in the world's greatest city,
and being on the cutting edge of American life and culture. At least as
far as baseball is concerned, New York City's claim to trend-setting
greatness is based amply in fact, for America's national game has long
been closely linked to its premier city. In the early nineteenth century,
numerous bat-and-ball variants were played throughout the United
States, with no uniformity or written rules.' ° In 1845, the Knickerbocker
Base Ball Club, a social organization for gentlemanly New Yorkers, laid
down the first comprehensive written rules for the game." Ironically,
the Knickerbockers played their games on the Elysian Fields in Hobo-
ken, New Jersey. 2 In the first recorded modern game of baseball, on
June 19, 1846, despite their status as path-breakers, the Knickerbockers
were crushed 23-1 by the New York Nine.3
Baseball, under the Knickerbocker rules, was a considerable im-
provement over the old ad-hoc variants, and through the 1850s, baseball
in the New York area exploded in popularity. 4 The Civil War gave
bored soldiers ample opportunity to play baseball, and the Knicker-
bocker rules quickly became the national standard.' By the end of the
war, baseball was played across the country, often referred to as the
"New York Game."'16
Since New York was, then as now, the nation's money-making capi-
tal, it was not long before the New York Game progressed from social
pastime to commercial enterprise. In 1862, at the corner of Lee Avenue
and Rutledge Street in Brooklyn, Union Grounds, the first for-profit
ballpark opened with wooden benches and a saloon for 1500 fans.' 7 In
1869, the Cincinnati Red Stockings, the first all-professional team,
toured the country and racked up a record of fifty-six wins, no losses,
and one tie, including six wins against leading New York teams.' 8
10. RADER, supra note 7, at 2.
11. Id. at 3-4.
12. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 260-61 (1972).
13. Id.
14. RADER, supra note 7, at 5. An 1857 song, The Baseball Fever, reported:
Our merchants have to close their stores Their clerks away are staying, Contractors,
too, can do no work, Their hands are all out playing.
15. Id. at 12-13.
16. Id. at 10.
17. Id. at 15.
18. Flood, 407 U.S. at 261; RADER, supra note 7, at 25-26. The 1869 Red Stockings' pay-
roll was $9,300, and for their winning record of 56-0-1, their owner reported an end-of-year
profit of $1.25. See Id.
19971
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The first professional league, the National Association of Profes-
sional Base Ball Players (hereinafter "National Association"), was
founded in New York in 1871 with eleven teams.1 9 The National Associ-
ation was loosely organized and was open to any professional team
which paid a modest entry fee.2" The National Association was replaced
in 1876 by the National League of Professional Base Ball Clubs (herein-
after "National League" or "NL").2' Where the National Association
had been an open, loosely-organized, player-oriented association, the
National League employed the monopolistic business practices of the
day to create an exclusive owners' cartel and eliminate competition from
other leagues. NL teams could only play other NL teams; clubs could be
based only in cities with populations of at least 75,000 (sizable for the
1870s); and player rosters of member clubs were protected from poach-
ing by other NL teams through the infamous "reserve clause."'2 Joined
only by the American League (hereinafter "AL"), which the National
League was compelled to recognize as a fellow major league in 1903,23
the MLB owners' cartel has succeeded in maintaining its monopoly over
major league baseball for the past 120 years.2 4
19. RADER, supra note 7, at 37.
20. Id. at 41. The entry fee was $10 per team. Id. During the five seasons it existed, the
National Association was dominated by Boston, which, led by the star pitcher Albert Spald-
ing, compiled a record of 207-56 from 1872-75. Id. at 38.
21. Flood, 407 U.S. at 261; RADER, supra note 7, at 36-43. The Nb's original teams were
located in Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati, Hartford, Louisville, New York, Philadelphia, and St.
Louis. Id. at 42.
22. RADER, supra note 7, at 45. First instituted in 1887 with the consent of the players,
who believed it in the best interests of baseball, the reserve clause system "[c]enter[ed] on the
uniformity of player contracts; the confinement of the player to the club that ha[d] him under
contract; the assignability of the player's contract; and the ability of the club annually to renew
the contract unilaterally, subject to a stated salary minimum." Flood, 457 U.S. at 260 n. 1. By
binding each player to the first organization which hired him at the beginning of his career, the
reserve system effectively reduced players to a serf-life existence from which they could es-
cape only by quitting baseball. GERALD W. SCULLY, Tim BusImss OF MAJOR LEAGUE
BASEBALL 29 (1989). Of course, even under the reserve system, MLB players were always
rather well-paid serfs. See RADER supra note 7, at 60.
Agreements between players and owners led to the abolition of the reserve system in 1976.
SCULLY at 192-94.
23. From its birth in 1894 as the Western League, the American League sparked the
Great Baseball War in 1901 when it declared itself a major league and raided the National
League for players. RADER, supra note 7, at 81. The following year, 1902, the young AL
outdrew the established NL, 2.2 million fans to 1.7 million. Id. In 1903, the AL invaded New
York with a new franchise, the Highlanders, and the NL made peace soon thereafter. Id.
24. On the MLB monopoly, see generally KENNETH M. JENNINGS, BALLS AND STRIKES:
TiE MoNEY GAME IN PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL (1990); DON KoWET, Tim RICH WHO OWN
SPORTS (1977); SCULLY, supra note 22.
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B. The Yankees
The New York Yankees are rightly regarded as both the epitome of
baseball and a symbol of the Bronx, linked to Yankee Stadium as by an
umbilical cord,2 5 but Yankee Stadium is actually the fourth home of the
franchise we now call the Yankees.
The birth of the New York Yankees was in part a by-product of the
Great Baseball War between the National and American Leagues.26
Ban Johnson, the head of the American League, lacked a team in New
York, and needed a Big Apple affiliate to help legitimize the AL as a
major league.2' Considering New Yorkers' current outrage at the pros-
pect of another city luring the Yankees away from New York, it is ironic
that the Yankees themselves started as a relocation team, when Johnson
sold his own Baltimore franchise to two wealthy and politically astute
New Yorkers, Bill Devery and Frank Farrel.2" The purchase price for
the whole franchise was $18,000.29
Devery and Farrel's political connections were important, because
the owners of the already-established NL New York Giants, John T.
Brush and Andrew Freedman, threatened to use their own real estate
and Tammany Hall connections to prevent the AL from securing the
needed site for a new stadium.30 Because of Devery's political clout in
northern Manhattan, he and Farrel were able to acquire a plot of land
atop a hill in Washington Heights, at Broadway and 162nd Street.3 '
There they erected a small wooden stadium with seats for 15,000 fans
called simply "Hilltop Park."32 They named the team which played on
top of the hill the "Highlanders," but early on they were nicknamed the
"Yankees," which was adopted as the team's official name during World
War 1.33
25. See Sullivan, supra note 4, at C1.
26. JOHN TuLLIus, I'D RATHER BE A YANKEE 3-5 (1986). On the New York Yankees see
generally, TOM MEANv, THE YANKEE STORY (1960); LAWRENCE S. RrrrER, THE GLORY OF
THEIR TIMES (1966).
27. RADER, supra note 7, at 80-81; TULLuS, supra note 26, at 4.
28. See TuLLius, supra note 26, at 4-5. Devery was a former Commissioner of the New
York City Police Department, and Farrel was a successful gambler. Id.
29. Id at 5.
30. RADER, supra note 7, at 80-81. Interestingly, Brush threatened to have New York
City use its power of eminent domain to prevent the AL from building a stadium in New York
by condemning any suitable tracts of land they acquired. Id.; See also, TULLIUS, supra note
26, at 4. "'No matter where you go, the city will decide to run a streetcar over second base,'
quipped Brush."
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The Highlanders made a run for the pennant in 1904, finishing the
season one half game behind the Boston Pilgrims, but they were a weak
team during their early years, and did not win a single pennant until
1921.34 By then the Yankees were under new ownership35 and were led
by a pitcher-turned-slugger named Babe Ruth.36 Under Ruth, the
Yankees began an unparalleled tradition of greatness which would span
the next forty years, during which time they would win twenty World
Series and twenty-nine AL pennants.
In 1923, the Yankees moved into their new stadium. It was located in
the Bronx across the Harlem River from the Polo Grounds where they
had played for a few years as tenants of the Giants. 7 The Colosseum-
like stadium seated as many as 74,000 fans, and took one year to build at
a cost of $2.5 million. 8 There the Yankees have played for more than
seventy years, building legends in the "Cathedral of Baseball.13 9
But by the early 1970s, the Yankees's aura of greatness was dimmed
and their "Cathedral" was decaying and outmoded. Moreover, the
club's new owner, George Steinbrenner, was already talking about tak-
ing the team out of the Bronx. In response, during 1974-76, elected offi-
cials arranged for a modernization of the old stadium, removing most of
its colossal exterior facade, clearing view-obstructing columns inside, and
reducing general seating to 57,000, while adding nineteen luxury suites. 40
However, Yankee Stadium's renovation had little effect on the de-
cline of the area around the stadium. From 1970 to 1980, the population
of the Bronx fell from 1.5 million to 1.2 million as crime and poverty
skyrocketed throughout much of the borough, as they did in New York
City as a whole.41 Through the 1980s and into the 1990s, Steinbrenner
was not alone in maintaining that the decline of the Bronx neighbor-
hoods around the stadium was keeping fans away from home games and
34. Id. at 9-24.
35. In 1915, Farrel and Devery sold the losing Yankees to Jacob Ruppert and Tillinghast
Huston for $460,000. Id. at 15.
36. Ruppert acquired Ruth from the Boston Red Sox in 1919 for $100,000 cash plus a
$300,000 loan to the owner of the Red Sox. Id. at 37.
37. TuLLiuS, supra note 26, at 63. The Yankees embarrassed the Giants by outdrawing
them while they shared the Polo Grounds from 1920-22. Id.
38. Id. at 63; Richard Sandomir, A 3d Pitch on Ruth's House, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1993,
§ 1, at 51.
39. Sullivan, supra note 4, at C1.
40. Sandomir, supra note 38, at 51. Estimates of the cost of the 1974-76 renovations range
from $78 million to over $100 million. Jim Dwyer, We're All Simian to Uncle George, NEWS-
DAY (City Ed.), July 22, 1994, at A2.
41. See EDWARD F. BERGMAN & THOMAS W. POHL, A GEOGRAPHY OF THE NEW YORK
METROPOLrrAN REGION 77-106 (1975).
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contributing to low profitability for the team.4' Moreover, despite the
stadium's extensive renovation during the early 1970s, today Yankee Sta-
dium is once again considered outmoded: it lacks the luxury suites nowa-
days considered indispensable to maximizing a sports facility's
profitability;43 it lacks adequate parking and other regional transporta-
tion links; and its postmodern, functional appearance is considered unat-
tractive now that the old-time look of stadiums like Boston's Fenway
Park and Baltimore's retro Camden Yards are fashionable. The Yankees
have indicated that they are considering a move to New Jersey's
Meadowlands sports complex when their Yankee Stadium lease expires
in 2002.44
Concerned about the blow to the city's economy and prestige a Yan-
kee departure would entail, civic leaders have begun planning to ensure
New York City's continued desirability as a home for the Yankees.4-
Attention has centered on two options: another renovation of Yankee
Stadium 46; or constructing a new stadium over rail yards in midtown
42. See Matthew Purdy, Alternative Sites for Yankee Stadium Are Studied, N.Y. Tiaras,
June 8, 1994, at B1; Sandomir, supra note 38. But see Dwyer, supra note 40, at A2:
... [N]ot a scrap of evidence shows that crime has kept the public away from Yankee
Stadium.... For instance,... [the years] between 1959 and 1966 includ[ed] five pen-
nant-winning teams and two World Series Championships. The average home attend-
ance for Yankee Stadium during those years was 1.4 million.... [In 1993], when there
were more murders in the city than all those years [combined], the attendance was 2.4
million ....
43. Expensive premium seating and enhanced concession marketing mean that a new sta-
dium can increase a sports team's annual revenues by up to 40%, or $15 million to $25 million.
John Riley, Where the Grass Is Always... Greener: An $8.1B Building Boom in Pro-Team
Stadiums: How Public Money Is Fueling Private Fortunes, NEWSDAY, Aug. 18, 1996, at A4. On
average, the team's market value can also be expected to grow by $30 million to $50 million.
Id.
44. Purdy, supra note 42.
45. A recent study by City Comptroller Alan Hevesi indicates that the Yankees's direct
and indirect contributions to New York City's economy will total $365.5 million in 1996, in-
cluding an estimated $58.4 million from the playoffs and World Series alone. Beth Holland,
World Series to Generate Financial Windfall for City, NEWSDAY (Queens Ed.), Oct. 17, 1996, at
A3. Direct benefits, totalling an estimated $197.4 million, include ticket sales and stadium
concession monies, broadcast fees, and money spent by fans at city bars, hotels, and restau-
rants. Indirect benefits, totalling an estimated $168.1 million, include money spent by busi-
nesses which benefit directly from the Yankee presence. Id. Some experts question the value
of such estimates, however, maintaining that they ignore the fact that residents and tourists
would spend those same dollars on other local attractions if the Yankees were not in town.
See Riley, supra note 43, at A4 ("'If all I'm doing is taking money I spend to buy a ticket at
Lincoln Center and spending it at Yankee Stadium, that's not new spending."')
46. The renovation would entail: eliminating 6,000 mezzanine seats to make room for 92
luxury suites; improving stadium access by upgrading nearby highways; expanding indoor
parking spaces to fit 12,000 to 15,000 cars; building a new Metro-North commuter railroad
1997]
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Manhattan near the Hudson River.47 The renovation option possesses
the advantages of being cheaper and more expedient; it would also be a
continuing boon to the Bronx's recovering image and local economy.
The West Side option, while considerably more expensive, would be
more likely to convince the Yankees to stay and would also generate
more additional economic activity for the city than the current site.
Largely because of the much smaller costs, local elected officials tend to
favor renovating the stadium over building the West Side complex. 4
Bronx, and Manhattan representatives, in particular, favor the renova-
tion plan, the Bronxites because they want to keep the Bombers in the
Bronx, and the Manhattanites, interestingly, because they do not want
another huge facility added to an already extremely crowded area.49
Mayor Giuliani, however, seems to favor the West Side plan, apparently
because it is preferred by the Yankees themselves and so it is more likely
to keep them from leaving New York City altogether.5
IT. EMINENT DOMAIN
The third major alternative is eminent domain: let the city or state
take over the Yankees franchise, either to run as a public corporation or
to resell to a private investor who would agree to keep the Yankees in
the Bronx.51 Considering the tremendous expense, even of simply reno-
vating the existing stadium, eminent domain could be a relatively cheap
station nearby; and reconstituting the Colosseum-like facade to give the stadium the desired
retro look. Purdy, supra note 42, at BI; Sandomir, supra note 38, at 51. It would cost an
estimated $250 million.
47. The most recent version of the West Side stadium provides for a state-of-the-art,
70,000-seat multi-purpose facility. Out of Bounds, supra note 4, at 28. Cost estimates have
ballooned to immense recent estimates as high as $1.1 billion. Of that sum, the city and state
would probably have to raise around $650 million, with the remainder coming from private
investors. Supporters of the West Side facility add that the complex would ultimately cost
taxpayers little, because the city could recoup its costs through a share of the facility's esti-
mated $200 million annual revenue stream. Id.
48. See Freifeld, supra note 6, at A4.
49. Borough Presidents Fernando Ferrer of the Bronx and Ruth Messinger of Manhattan
are vocal proponents of keeping the Yankees in the Bronx. Id. The fact that the West Side
stadium would be near the Javits Convention Center, Madison Square Garden, Penn Station,
and Times Square is thus both a plus and a minus.
50. Id. at A4; Purdy, supra note 42, at B1.
51. See Brodsky, supra note 6, at 12; Freifeld, supra note 6; Bob Katz, Seize the Teams -
That's the Ticket for Baseball!, NEWSDAY (Nassau & Suffolk Ed.), Sept. 1, 1994, at A45; Geof-
frey Samuels & Tim Cone, End Sports Blackmail: Cities Should Take Over Pro Teams, Not Let
Them Flee Town, USA TODAY, May 2, 1996, at 13A. The idea of a city takeover of the
Yankees is not new. See Herbert J. Gans, Stop Letting George Do It, N.Y. TIMEs, June 4,
1984, at A19 (urging city takeover of Yankees as response to Steinbrenner's overbearing and
demoralizing management of team).
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option.52 Furthermore, if successful, it will be failproof: there would be
no risk of spending hundreds of millions of dollars to keep the Yankees
only to lose them anyway to some other municipality with a more attrac-
tive arrangement.5 3
Eminent domain may be defined as "the power of the sovereign to
take property for public use without the owner's consent upon making
just compensation."54 Along with the police power and the power of
52. A recent estimate valued the Yankees franchise at $209 million, making it the most
valuable baseball franchise, and the third-most valuable team in any sport, behind football's
Dallas Cowboys and Miami Dolphins. Plentz, supra note 4, at 1. Compare the $250 million to
$1.1 billion price tags for renovating Yankee Stadium or building a new one. See supra notes
46-47 and accompanying text. Moreover, the Yankees are one of baseball's most profitable
teams, with 1995 profits of about $24 million and 1996 profits well in excess of that figure. Id.
53. Probably no city is more familiar with the pains of franchise relocation than New
York, which within the past 40 years has lost baseball's Dodgers to Los Angeles and Giants to
San Francisco; football's Giants and Jets to New Jersey; and basketball's Nets to New Jersey.
See Freifeld, supra note 6. But relocation has by no means been unique to New York. From
1979-89, basketball's New Orleans Jazz moved to Utah, Kansas City's Kings moved to Sacra-
mento, and San Diego's Clippers moved to Los Angeles. Robert M. Jarvis, Book Review,
When The Lawyers Slept: The Unmaking of the Brooklyn Dodgers, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 347
n.2 (1989). In football, Oakland's Raiders moved to Los Angeles, Baltimore's Colts moved to
Indianapolis, and St. Louis Cardinals moved to Phoenix. Id. In hockey, Atlanta's Flames
moved to Calgary and the Colorado Rockies became the New Jersey Devils. Id. Numerous
other teams have wrested concessions from their host cities by threatening to move elsewhere.
IL; See also Riley, supra note 43 (noting "St. Louis' successful wooing of the Los Angeles
Rams to a 100-percent subsidized $258 million stadium a little over a year ago, Maryland's
deal late in 1995 to build a $200 million stadium that turned Cleveland's Browns into the
Baltimore Ravens, and Nashville's $290 million stadium deal that persuaded the Houston Oil-
ers to bang helmets in Music City"); Samuels & Cone, supra note 51 (noting that Dade
County, Florida, has agreed to build a new arena for basketball's Miami Heat to prevent them
from leaving only eight years after the county built the Heat its current arena).
Litigation over franchise relocation has not been uncommon. See, e.g., Nat'l Basketball
Ass'n v. San Diego Clippers Basketball Club, Inc., 815 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed
sub nom.; Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 484 U.S. 960
(1987) (holding that the Sherman Antitrust Act prevented the NBA from barring the Clip-
pers's move from San Diego to Los Angeles); Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Balti-
more Football Club, Inc., 624 F. Supp. 278 (D. Md. 1985) (holding that the City of Baltimore
was unable to condemn the Colts to prevent the team's move to Indianapolis because the
Colts had already moved and were no longer within the City's jurisdiction); San Francisco
Seals, Ltd. v. Nat'l Hockey League, 379 F. Supp. 966 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (holding that the Sher-
man Antitrust Act, while applicable to hockey, did not prevent the NHL from barring the
Seals's move from San Francisco, Cal., to Vancouver, B.C.); City of Oakland v. Oakland Raid-
ers, 646 P.2d 835 (Cal. 1982), on remand, 220 Cal. Rptr. 153 (Cal. App. 1985) (California
Supreme Court holding that the City of Oakland could condemn the Oakland Raiders to
prevent them from moving to Los Angeles; on remand, California Court of Appeals holding
Oakland's exercise of eminent domain in violation of U.S. Constitution's Commerce Clause).
54. NicHoLs ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.11 (3d ed. rev. 1971 & Supp. 1996). See also Peo-
ple v. Adirondack Ry. Co., 160 N.Y. 225,237,54 N.E. 689, 692 (1899); Bloodgood v. Mohawk
& Hudson R.R. Co., 18 Wend. 9, 13 (N.Y. 1837); Beekman v. Saratoga & Schenectady R.R.
1997]
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taxation, the power of eminent domain is one of the fundamental attrib-
utes of sovereignty, essential to the functioning of the state."
A glance at the definition of eminent domain reveals that the power
entails four distinct factors: (1) a taking (2) of property (3) for public use
(4) with just compensation. 6 Of course, the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution mandate that any exer-
cise of the power, by the Federal government or by any of the states,
comport with the requirements of due process.5 7
Exercise of the eminent domain power in New York is governed by
the Eminent Domain Procedure Law (hereinafter "EDPL").58 While
the EDPL focuses chiefly on condemnations of real property,59 condem-
nations of other types of property must also conform to the procedures
and standards set out within it.60
A condemnation of the Yankees would obviously entail a taking,6'
but the applicability of the property, public use, and just compensation
elements merit some attention.
Co., 3 Paige Ch. 45, 72 (N.Y. Ch. 1831). See also Terrace Hotel, Inc. v. State, 19 N.Y.2d 526,
528, 227 N.E.2d 846, 849 (1967); Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc. v. City of New York, 11
N.Y.2d 342, 347, 183 N.E.2d 684, 687 (1962).
The most universal definition of eminent domain would actually dispense with the require-
ment for just compensation, but the stricture against uncompensated takings found in the Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment,
makes just compensation a mandatory element of American eminent domain. The term "emi-
nent domain" was apparently coined by the Dutch jurist, Grotius, who stated that "'property
... is under the eminent domain of the state, so that the state ... may use and even alienate
and destroy such property ... for ends of public utility...."' JAcQUES B. GELIN & DAVID W.
MILLER, THE FEDERAL LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.1, at 3 (1982).
55. Adirondack, 160 N.Y. at 236-37.
56. Julius L. Sackman, The Right to Condemn, 29 Ar.B. L. REV. 177 (1965).
57. U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV; N.Y. Const. art. I, § 7. Thus the state may not take
property without granting the condemnee a fair hearing; nor may it take property for a private
use, no matter how fair the hearing. Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896). See
WILLIAM B. LOCKHART, ET AL., THE AmRIcAN CONSTULON: CASES - COMMENTS -
QUESTIONS 231 (7th Ed. 1991 & Supp. 1995).
58. N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAv §§ 101-709 (Consol. 1996) (hereinafter "EDPL"). "It is
the purpose of [the EDPL] to provide the exclusive procedure by which property shall be
acquired by exercise of the power of eminent domain in New York state[.]" Id. § 101.
59. EDPL § 104 ("The [EDPL] shall be uniformly applied to any and all acquisitions by
eminent domain of real property within the state of New York.").
60. EDPL § 708 ("[acquisition of] title to property other than real property.., shall be in
the manner and procedure prescribed for the acquisition of real property under this chapter").
61. A "taking" may be said to occur where there has been "such an interference with the
rights of an owner as to deprive him of control of his property." Sackman, supra note 56, at
183, cited in, Cushman v. Smith, 34 Me. 247 (1852). See also Livermore v. Town of Jamaica, 23
Vt. 361 (1851).
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A. Are the Yankees "Property"?
While eminent domain has traditionally been associated with the tak-
ing of realty; personalty, including intangible property, is not exempt
from the state's power.62 A franchise, though it may be nothing more
than a bundle of privileges and contractual rights,63 is thus condemnable,
along with any tangible property which the franchise may own.64 Thus, a
professional sports franchise is merely another category of condemnable
property.65
B. Would the Taking Be for the Public Use?
An important question in a taking of the Yankees would be whether
the taking was being effected for a "public use." Traditionally, the word
"use" was narrowly interpreted to mean employment, so that a property
was only said to have been taken for a public use if the state itself was
going to use or enjoy the property. 66 But the contemporary understand-
ing of "public use" is "public advantage."'67 Thus, a condemnation which
promotes the state's economic well-being may serve the public use, as
may a condemnation effected merely for aesthetic purposes. 68 In partic-
ular, exercise of the eminent domain power for the purpose of construct-
62. Adirondack Ry., 160 N.Y. at 238 ("[a]U private property, both tangible and intangible,
is subject to [eminent domain]"); People ex rel. Griffin v. Mayor and Common Council of the
City of Brooklyn, 9 Barb. 535, 54546 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1850), aff'd, 4 N.Y. 419 (1851) ("The
word property must therefore be taken to comprehend money, as well as every thing of which
man may legally have the absolute and exclusive dominion."). See also NIcHoLs, supra note
54, § 2.1[2]; Sackman, supra note 56, at 188; EDPL § 708 (providing for condemnation of
property "other than real property"); Griffin, 4 N.Y. at 422 (money is property which may be
condemned by state); Morris Canal & Banking Co. v. Townsend, 24 Barb. 658, 665 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1857) (chose-in-action is property condemnable by state).
63. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 658 (6th Ed. 1990).
64. West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 534 (1848) ("A franchise is prop-
erty, and nothing more; it is incorporeal property ...."); Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc. v.
City of New York, 11 N.Y.2d 342, 183 N.E.2d 684, (1962) (condemnation by city of private bus
company, including employee contracts and all related tangible property). See N.Y. GEN.
Crrv LAW § 20 (Consol. 1996) (authorizing New York City to condemn property and
franchises of any omnibus company operating wholly within city lines).
65. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Baltimore Football Club, Inc., 624 F. Supp.
278, 282 (D. Md. 1985) (referring to Baltimore's attempted condemnation of football Colts,
court stated that "it is now beyond dispute that intangible property is properly the subject of
condemnation proceedings").
66. Sackman, supra note 56, at 182.
67. Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v. Port of New York Auth., 12 N.Y.2d 379, 388-90, 190
N.E.2d 402, 404-406, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 78 (1963); Cannata v. City of New York, 11
N.Y.2d 210, 214-15, 182 N.E.2d 395, 396-97, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 4 (1962).
68. Courtesy Sandwich Shop, 190 N.E.2d at 405.
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ing or operating a sports facility may be a public use.6 9 In fact, the
promoti6ln of professional sports as a public purpose is expressly recog-
nized in the proposed New York State Sports Fan Protection Act, be-
cause of sports' importance to the "economic health and social welfare
of the state."7
C. "Just Compensation"
The issue of just compensation is central to a condemnation of the
Yankees, although a detailed treatment of valuation standards and tech-
niques is beyond the scope of this paper.7' While not inherent in the
concept of eminent domain, just compensation from the condemnor to
the condemnee, is mandated by the Federal and New York
Constitutions.7"
The idea that the compensation for condemned property must be
"just," "evokes ideas of 'fairness' and 'equity"';73 as a practical matter,
"just compensation" is generally equivalent to "market value." 74 "Mar-
ket value" may itself be loosely defined as what a willing buyer would
pay a willing seller.75 The compensation must be "just" to the public as
well as the property owner; thus, the fact that the property is being taken
by condemnation may not be factored into the appraisal to inflate the
69. Murphy v. Erie County, 28 N.Y.2d 80, 87-88, 268 N.E.2d 771,774 (1971); City of New
York v. New York Jets Football Club, Inc., 90 Misc.2d 311, 315, 394 N.Y.S.2d 799, 803 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1977); New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth. v. McCrane, 292 A.2d 545,552
(N.J. 1972), appeal dismissed; Martin v. City of Philadelphia, 215 A.2d 894, 896 (Pa. 1966).
70. A.B. 684, 220th Gen. Assembly, 1997-1998 Reg. Sess. (1997). In defining the preser-
vation, maintenance, and expansion of professional sports in New York State as public pur-
poses, the Act would have the legislature find and declare:
that sporting events and public sports facilities, including, but not limited to, profes-
sional sports franchises are a significant and important part of the economic health and
social welfare of the state and of communities within the state, and contribute finan-
cially and socially to the creation of stable communities across New York state.
Id. § 2. In addition to the entertainment they provide for millions of New Yorkers, the
Yankees are directly responsible for 1160 jobs and hundreds of millions of dollars of economic
benefits. Riley, supra note 43, at A4.
71. On just compensation criteria and appraisal techniques, see generally GELIN &
MILLER, supra note 54, §§ 3.1-4.3, at 101-381; NicHoLs, supra note 54.
72. U.S. CONST. amend. V; N.Y. CONsT. art. I, § 7.
73. United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 124 (1950).
74. Sparkill Realty Corp. v. State, 268 N.Y. 192, 197 N.E. 192 (1935); In re Brookfield, 176
N.Y, 138 (1903).
75. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373-75 (1943); In re Board of Water Supply, 277
N.Y. 452, 14 N.E.2d 789 (1938).
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valuation.7 6 The compensation must be assessed as of the date the prop-
erty is taken.77
The Yankees's status as the most famous team in sports history has
helped to make them the most valuable franchise in baseball.78 Esti-
mates uniformly place their worth at "well over" $200 million, with Fi-
nancial World magazine placing the team's value at $209 ilion.79
Ironically, the same great fame which makes the Yankees such a valua-
ble team also makes it unlikely that 1996's well-publicized World Series
victory will elevate their worth much above its current level.8" More-
over, the Yankees's profitability is also unlikely to increase next year,
because any increases in attendance and concession revenues, probably
will be offset by increased outlays for salaries as players seek to cash in
on their own success. Finally, the cornerstone of the Yankees's $100 mil-
lion-plus annual revenues, their $43 million per-year contract with the
Madison Square Garden cable network (hereinafter "MSG"), will expire
in 2000, and media analysts doubt that that figure will be matched by
MSG or any other network.8 '
Therefore, given the offsetting of the Yankees' recently enhanced
profile by projections for increased outlays and stagnant revenue, the net
worth of the franchise is unlikely to increase in the next few years much
beyond its current level of approximately $209 million - certainly not
beyond $250 million."z Even adding a few million dollars for the costs of
the legal battle that would likely result from a state takeover, it would
76. See Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910); Bauman v.
Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 574-75 (1897).
77. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943); In re Board of Water Supply, 277
N.Y. 452, 14 N.E.2d 789 (1938). If payment is made at some point after the taking, then the
compensation must also include interest. In re City of New York (Bronx River Parkway), 284
N.Y. 48, 29 N.E.2d 465 (1940), affd, 313 U.S. 540 (1941).
78. See Out of Bounds, supra note 4, at 28. Key to the Yankees's financial success is their
12-year, $486 million cable television contract with the Madison Square Garden Network.
Plentz, supra note 4, at 1. "'The biggest thing that separates the value of the Yankees from
any other team is their media revenue. They do more than twice what the average team does
in all media."' Id. (quoting Michael Ozanian, deputy editor of Financial World magazine).
79. Out of Bounds, supra note 4, at 28; Plentz, supra note 4, at 1.
80. "'If you're talking about the Milwaukee Brewers, for example, and they made the
World Series, that could possibly raise the intangible values and you would pay for that. But
the Yankees have such a storied history, they're famous as it is already."' Plentz, supra note 4,
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still be a bargain compared to the renovation or new stadium
estimates.83
In sum, under the applicable New York and Federal eminent domain
law, a condemnation of the Yankees would meet all of the requirements
for a valid taking.
III. BEYOND EMINENT DOMAIN: OTHER LEGAL QUESTIONS
A. Antitrust Law
Apart from a forced taking of the team by eminent domain, it is con-
ceivable that major league baseball itself might intervene to prevent a
Yankees move out of New York. Professional sports leagues are essen-
tially monopolistic owners' cartels, with each team cooperating with
other teams to ensure league success and minimize friction among
teams. 4 Among other monopolistic practices, the leagues conspire to
limit competition in the form of new teams; they also cooperate in regu-
lating competition by requiring league approval of relocation of existing
teams." The ability of sports leagues to maintain their monopolies is
limited, because all professional sports, apart from baseball, 6 have been
held subject to the provisions of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 7 Because
83. See notes 46-47 and accompanying text. The takeover could be financed by the selling
of shares to the public. See Freifeld, supra note 6, at A4 ("'What we're proposing is that New
Yorkers be the stockholders and keep the team in New York, and whatever money needs to
be raised, be raised by the sale of stock, not taxpayers."') (quoting Assemblyman Richard
Gottfried, Democrat of Manhattan, one of the sponsors of the New York State Sports Fan
Protection Act). Municipal ownership of professional sports teams is not uncommon. See
Charles Mahtesian, Menmo to Cities: If You Can't Bribe the Owner, Maybe You Can Buy the
Team, GOVERNING MAGAZINE, March, 1996, at 42 (cities owning professional sports teams
include Harrisburg, Pa. and Scranton, Pa.).
84. See notes 21-24, supra, and accompanying text.
85. Id.
86. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356
(1953); Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). In Federal Baseball,
the Court held that baseball could not be held subject to the provisions of the Sherman Act
because baseball was a sport and not commerce. In Toolson, the Court summarily upheld
Federal Baseball on its stare decisis effect, noting that Congress had approved of baseball's
exemption from the antitrust laws by its positive inaction. Finally, in Flood, the Court recog-
nized that professional baseball was commerce and not sport, and acknowledged that its judi-
cial exemption from the Sherman Act was anomalous and anachronistic, but held that the
problem was for Congress to resolve through legislation, not the Court.
87. Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act provides that:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is declared to
be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or
conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony. ..
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of the Sherman Act's proscriptions, the courts have generally frowned
upon league actions barring franchise movement. 8
However, it is not clear whether major league baseball would be per-
mitted to interfere with franchise relocation, because recent cases have
questioned the scope of baseball's antitrust exemption following the de-
cision in Flood. These cases maintain that baseball's exemption remains
in force, but is limited strictly to the areas raised on the facts of Flood
and its predecessors, that is, to "league structure and player relations." 9
If the recent trend is correct in holding that the exemption is limited to
player relations, then major league baseball would probably be unable to
prevent the Yankees from leaving New York.
B. The Commerce Clause Defense
An interesting argument against the condemning of the Yankees
would be that it violates the United States Constitution's Commerce
Clause, as enumerated in Article I, section 8, clause 3.90 Under the com-
15 U.S.C.S. § 1 (1996). To one degree or another, practically every major professional sport
has been held subject to the Sherman Act's provisions. See Radovich v. Nat'l Football
League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957), rehearing denied 77 S.Ct. 716, (professional football is subject to
provisions of Sherman Antitrust Act); United States v. Int'l Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955)
(interstate promotion of professional fights constitutes "commerce" within the meaning of the
Sherman Act); Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. San Diego Clippers Basketball Club, 815 F.2d 562
(9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 484 U.S. 960 (1987); Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v. United States Ten-
nis Ass'n, 665 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1981); Deesen v. Prof. Golfers' Ass'n of America, 358 F.2d
165 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966); Philadelphia World Hockey Ass'n v. Philadel-
phia Hockey Club, 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
88. See Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. San Diego Clippers Basketball Club, Inc., 815 F.2d 562
(holding that Sherman Antitrust Act prevented NBA from barring Clippers's move from San
Diego to Los Angeles); Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League,
726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984) (Sherman Act prevented NFL from barring Raiders's move from
Oakland to Los Angeles). But see San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. Nat'l Hockey League, 379 F.
Supp. 966 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (holding that Sherman Antitrust Act, while applicable to hockey,
did not prevent NHL from barring Seals's move from San Francisco, Cal., to Vancouver,
B.C.).
89. Postema v. Nat'l League of Prof. Baseball Clubs, 799 F. Supp. 1475, 1488 (S.D.N.Y.
-1992). See Diversified Foods, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 985 F.2d 27,30 (1st Cir. 1993)
("[B]aseball's judicial 'exemption' from the antitrust laws... persists but is not extended.");
Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 438 n. 21 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (baseball's anti-
trust exemption is limited to the reserve clause); Butterworth v. Nat'l League of Prof. Baseball
Clubs, 644 So.2d 1021, 1025 (Fla. 1994) ("[B]aseball's antitrust exemption extends only to the
reserve system."). But see McCoy v. Major League Baseball, 911 F. Supp. 454, 457 (W.D.
Wash. 1995) ("the great weight of authority recognizes that the scope of the antitrust exemp-
tion covers the business of baseball"); American Academic Suppliers, Inc. v. Beckley-Cardy,
Inc., 699 F. Supp. 152, 156 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (baseball enjoys a "blanket exemption").
90. See Julie Dorst, Franchise Relocation: Reconsidering Major League Baseball's Carte
Blanche Control, 4 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 553 (1994); Charles Gray, Keeping the Home
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merce clause, Congress has the power to regulate commerce among the
states.91 The intent of the clause is to promote an efficient national
economy by limiting state economic protectionism.92 Accordingly, state
legislation may not conflict with Congressional legislation addressing
commerce. 93 Moreover, even where Congress chooses not to exercise its
power to regulate a specific portion of interstate commerce, the states'
power to regulate is limited by the "dormant" commerce power, which
bars state regulation which would unduly burden interstate commerce.9 4
In evaluating a state's regulation of interstate commerce, the Supreme
Court has articulated a three-part balancing test, wherein the court as-
sessing the state regulation must: (1) determine whether there is a legiti-
mate local interest in restricting commerce; (2) measure the burden
which the regulation places on interstate commerce; and (3) decide
whether "the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits." 95
Since professional baseball collectively is engaged in interstate com-
merce, the Yankees might respond to an attempted state takeover by
invoking the dormant commerce power and arguing that New York's ex-
ercise of eminent domain would impermissibly burden interstate com-
merce. In fact, that was the argument relied upon by the Oakland
Raiders in their successful defense against an attempted takeover by the
City of Oakland.96 In Raiders I, Oakland successfully argued that the
Raiders franchise was susceptible to the city's eminent domain power.97
In Raiders I1, on remand for consideration of whether the condemnation
met the public use requirement, the Raiders won by raising the dormant
commerce power as a bar to the city action; the question of public use
Team at Home, 74 CALi. L. REv. 1329 (1986); Lisa J. Tobin-Rubio, Casenote, Eminent Do-
main and the Commerce Clause Defense: City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 41 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1185 (1987); Daniel S. York, Note, The Professional Sports Community Protection Act
Congress' Best Response to Raiders?, 38 HASTNGS L.J. 345 (1987).
91. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3.
92. See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935).
93. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319
(1851).
94. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 128 (1978); Southern Pac. Co. v.
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 774-75 (1945).
95. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S.
137, 142 (1970).
96. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 176 Cal. Rptr. 646 (Ct. App. 1981), rev'd 646
P.2d 835 (Cal. 1982) (hereinafter Raiders 1), on remand 220 Cal. Rptr. 153 (Ct. App. 1985)
(hereinafter Raiders 11).
97. Raiders I, 646 P.2d at 843.
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was not reached.9s The court reasoned that the National Football
League was engaged in interstate commerce, and that the city's interest
in promoting social welfare and economic benefits was handily out-
weighed by the threat of "serious... disrupt[ion of] the balance of eco-
nomic bargaining on stadium leases throughout the nation" posed by
permitting the city to "permanently indenture. . ." the Raiders to Oak-
land.99 The court correctly rejected Oakland's argument that the com-
merce clause did not apply to the taking, because it was acting as a
market participant rather than as a regulator.10
Condemnations of sports franchises are rare. Raiders II is probably
the only instance of a condemnee's use of the commerce clause as a de-
fense to a taking.' 0 ' Nonetheless, its conclusion that the condemning of
a professional sports franchise constitutes an impermissible burden to
interstate commerce is far from inescapable."° In fact, in what is proba-
bly the only other case involving an attempted condemnation of a pro-
fessional sports franchise, Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v.
Baltimore Football Club, Inc. (hereinafter Baltimore Football Club), °3
the court recognized that a sports franchise can be a proper subject of
eminent domain, but never mentioned the commerce clause, although
the court was aware of, and had cited to Raiders. °4
98. Raiders II, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 156-58.
99. Id As an alternative holding, the court suggested that Oakland's condemnation
would be equivalent to a prohibition on outgoing commerce and thus a per se violation of the
commerce clause. Id. at 157 n. 3. This view is probably incorrect, however, since the city
taking over the franchise would not be prohibiting outgoing commerce, merely taking over the
business and supplying the commerce itself - the city-owned team would continue to play its
scheduled games, receiving visiting teams and travelling regularly to other states when playing
road games.
100. Id. at 156. Oakland was seeking to use its sovereign power to acquire the franchise,
not making a fair offer and hoping it would be accepted. Id.
101. A rare example of the commerce clause defense may be found in Elberton v. State
Highway Dep't, 89 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. 1955), where the Georgia Supreme Court held that the
State Highway Department's condemnation of railway property did not interfere with inter-
state commerce.
102. See Gray, supra note 90, at 1343-50 & Tobin-Rubio, supra note 90, at 1198-1221. A
threshold counter argument against the commerce clause defense would be that the Supreme
Court in Federal Baseball held that baseball is not commerce, and Federal Baseball has never
been overruled. See Part III.A., supra. This counter argument is unlikely to succeed, how-
ever, since the Court in Flood expressly acknowledged that professional baseball is commerce.
Id. Moreover, recent cases indicate that baseball's antitrust exemption is highly truncated and
possibly limited only to the reserve clause. Id.
103. 624 F. Supp. 278 (D. Md. 1985).
104. In Baltimore Football Club, Baltimore sought to condemn the Colts in order to pre-
vent them from moving to Indianapolis, but the owner of the Colts physically moved the
franchise to Indianapolis on the very eve of the condemnation proceedings. 624 F. Supp. at
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It seems fair to say that the taking of a sports franchise will usually
not impermissibly burden interstate commerce. The Yankees, for in-
stance, can be fairly characterized as an integral part of New York
State's cultural heritage, as evidenced by the turnout of 3.5 million New
Yorkers at the recent ticker tape parade. More concretely, the Yankees
contribute hundreds of millions of dollars annually to the state's econ-
omy and are directly responsible for 1160 jobs. Thus, keeping the
Yankees in New York is clearly a legitimate local interest. In contrast,
the burden on interstate commerce - the burden on major league base-
ball - posed by the taking would be small. The taking would scarcely
affect the flow of interstate commerce - the playing of baseball games
- at all; all that would change would be the ownership of the franchise.
In sum, the burden placed on baseball by the taking of the Yankees,
would decidedly not seem "clearly excessive" to the corresponding bene-
fits to the state.
C. Which Way Did They Go? The Anticipatory Flight Defense
Strong as the state with its power of eminent domain might be, it
may have an Achilles heel: what if the Yankees simply pack up and
leave once they learn that condemnation proceedings are imminent?
It is axiomatic that a state may only condemn property within its own
borders, and not property or rights in property located in another
state.10 5 In Baltimore Football Club,106 the owner of the Colts used this
principle to successfully evade the eminent domain power of the city of
Baltimore. The outcome of the case turned on a fact-sensitive analysis
of whether the Colts were "present," for eminent domain purposes, in
Maryland when Baltimore ified its condemnation petition.
In Baltimore Football Club, Baltimore sought to condemn the foot-
ball Colts to prevent them from moving to Indianapolis. 0 7 Negotiations
between Baltimore and the Colts had begun in late 1983, but by early
1984 were at an impasse.'0 8 On February 1, 1984, the City of Indianapo-
280-81. At issue was whether the Colts were "present" in Baltimore when the city sought to
condemn them. Id. at 279. Although Raiders II, decided two months earlier, would have
given the court a solid alternative for holding, as it did, in favor of the Colts, it is mentioned
nowhere in the opinion.
105. NiCHOLS, supra note 54, § 2.12 ("The powers of a sovereign state, however vast in
their character and searching in their extent, are inherently limited to subjects within the juris-
diction of the state, and any attempt to exercise governmental powers in another state is nec-
essarily void.")
106. 624 F. Supp. 278 (D. Md. 1985)
107. Id. at 279.
108. Id.
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lis suggested that the Colts might move to the Hoosier Dome, and nego-
tiations began shortly thereafter. 1°9 On February 24, 1984, a bill was
introduced in the Maryland Senate which authorized Baltimore to con-
demn professional sports franchises." 0 The Colts meanwhile made rapid
progress in negotiations with Indianapolis on lease terms and financing
provisions, while continuing discussions with Baltimore."'
On March 27,1984, the Maryland Senate passed the bill which would
allow Baltimore to condemn the Colts."' The next day, March 28, 1994,
Bob Irsay, the Colts owner, decided to move the team immediately to
Indianapolis, before Baltimore could begin condemnation proceedings.
Irsay instructed his agent in Indianapolis to immediately execute a
twenty-year lease for the Hoosier Dome, and to enter into a related loan
financing deal." 3 Meanwhile, all through the 28th and into the morning
of the 29th, the Colts organization scrambled frantically to load the bulk
of the franchises tangible possessions, both office and athletic equip-
ment, from the team's Maryland training center into moving vans.1 4 On
the morning of March 29, 1984, the vans, loaded with most of the Colts's
physical property, left Baltimore for Indianapolis." 5 Irsay then notified
then-NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle that he had, "relocated the Colts
franchise to Indianapolis as of the close of business March 28, 1984."'16
Later on March 29, Baltimore extended a 24-hour, written offer to the
Colts, at the team's corporate headquarters in Skokie, Illinois, to
purchase the franchise for $40 million; the offer was not accepted.1 7 On
March 30, 1984, the Maryland legislature and Baltimore City Council
enacted the Colts condemnation legislation and ordinance, and immedi-
ately filed a condemnation petition in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City." 8 The Circuit Court then issued a writ of ne exeat against the
Colts, purporting to bar them from moving the franchise out of the state
of Maryland." 9
109. Id.
110. Id. Unlike states, which are sovereign, some cities have no inherent power to con-
demn. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835, 838 (Cal. 1982).
111. Baltimore Football Club, 624 F. Supp. at 279-280.




116. Baltimore Football Club, 624 F.Supp. at 280.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 280-81.
119. Id.
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On March 31, 1984, the Capital Improvements Board of Marion
County, owner of the Hoosier Dome, approved the twenty-year lease
agreement with the Colts.120 On April 5, 1984, the Colts obtained a li-
cense to do business in Indiana. On May 11, 1984, the Colts notified
Baltimore that they were terminating their lease at Memorial Stadium,
and on September 17, 1984, the Colts closed their Maryland checking
accounts.
121
On these facts, the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland found that, as of March 30, 1984, the day that Baltimore filed
its condemnation petition against the Colts and the Baltimore Circuit
Court issued its writ of ne exeat against them, the Colts were no longer
"present" in Maryland for purposes of eminent domain: they were "gone
from Maryland."' 22 In reaching that holding, the court correctly rejected
as unworkable Baltimore's suggestion that it apply International Shoe-
type "minimum contacts" analysis to determine whether an exercise of
eminent domain was proper."~ While "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice" may mandate a court's use of "minimum con-
tacts" in assessing whether it may properly assert personal jurisdiction
over a foreign corporation, 124 to allow a state to condemn a legal person
because it is, for instance, merely "doing business" on some minimal
level within the state might not comport with due process."~ Rather,
since eminent domain is a right of the sovereign over property located
within its borders, all property should be condemnable only in the one
state where it is situated.
26
120. Id. at 279, 281.
121. Baltimore Football Club, 624 F. Supp. at 281.
122. Id. at 289. On that day, the Colts's remaining contacts with Maryland consisted of a
lease on Memorial Stadium, a lease on the team's Owings Mills training facility, a lease of
certain facilities in Westminster, Maryland, broadcasting contracts in Maryland through April,
1984, and four commercial checking accounts. Id.
123. Id. at 284-85. The court also rejected as inapposite an application of the law of es-
cheat's "last known address" rule, since "in escheat proceedings,... the location of the owner
of the property is usually unknown, [whereas] condemnation proceedings simply require the
court to determine where.., the property was located on a given date." Id., 624 F. Supp. at
287.
124. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 64 (1994).
125. Baltimore Football Club, 624 F. Supp. at 284-85.
126. See NicHOLS, supra note 54, § 2.12[4]. Accordingly, a giant multi-state corporation,
chartered in one state but with multiple headquarters and operations in other states, might
only be properly condemnable by the Federal government, or perhaps by two or more states
acting in concert. Compare the eminent domain power of the Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey. Id. § 2.12[5].
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WE'LL TAKE THE YANKEES
D. Anticipatory Flight: Possible Countermeasures
Baltimore lost its chance to prevent the Colts from leaving town in
large part because the state legislature dithered for a full month between
introduction and passage of the condemnation-enabling legislation. 27
Resolute action is needed to minimize the possibility of a "midnight run"
by Steinbrenner and the Yankees to another locale. Legislation enabling
a condemnation of the Yankees must be passed by the state legislature as
soon as possible. This could be in the form of the New York State Sports
Fan Protection Act, which was introduced to the Assembly in January,
1995, and is currently in committee. 2 If there is any perceived danger
of a "midnight run," then the Sports Facilities Authority or other appro-
priate state or city agency should initiate condemnation proceedings
without hesitating. If necessary, the Authority should consider accelerat-
ing the condemnation by bypassing the EDPL's hearing provisions in
accordance with the "emergency situation" provisions of Article 2 of the
EDPL.'29
IV. CONCLUSION
The 1996 Yankees's win in the World Series is only the latest chapter
in New York City's ninety-three-year love affair with the Bronx Bomb-
ers. The Yankees are one of New York's most prominent cultural icons,
important to the city's economy, and elected officials have a duty to take
resolute steps to prevent their loss.
Approaching $1.1 billion, new stadium and stadium renovation plans
are too expensive and politically intractable to be viable options, and,
even if executed, they offer no guarantees of keeping the team in-state.
In contrast, paying about $209 million, and simply taking the team
through the state's power of eminent domain would be relatively cheap,
127. See Gray, supra note 90, at 1330-32.
128. New York State Sports Fan Protection Act, A.B. 684, 220th Gen. Assembly, 1997-
1998 Reg. Sess. (1997). The Sports Fan Protection Act would establish a New York State
Sports Facilities Authority responsible for "preserving and expanding opportunities across
New York state for sports events, facilities, and franchises," Id. § 2, and authorized to con-
demn franchises in order to prevent them from leaving the state. Id §§ 4(6), (16), 8(2).
129. EDPL § 206(D). "The condemnor shall be exempt from compliance with the [notice
and public hearing] provisions of this article when... because of an emergency situation the
public interest will be endangered by any delay caused by the public hearing requirement in
this article." Id. §§ 206, 206(D). See Yonkers Racing Corp. v. City of Yonkers, 858 F.2d 855
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 1527 (1988) (when under court order to desegregate federally-
subsidized low-income housing, Yonkers was faced with an "emergency situation" which justi-
fied invoking Section 206(D)'s exemption, even though Yonkers had created the emergency
itself by violating civil rights laws and prompting court order).
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especially if financed through a sale of shares to baseball-loving New
Yorkers. Eminent domain is a venerable legal doctrine, and such a tak-
ing should be upheld if challenged in court. Once condemned, there
would be no question of the Yankees leaving the state.
The State Legislature should immediately pass the proposed New
York State Sports Fan Protection Act, currently sitting in committee, and
establish the New York State Sports Facilities Authority, with the power
to condemn franchises to keep them in state. Authority officials should
then carefully monitor negotiations with the Yankees and should not
hesitate to condemn the team if there is any danger of their leaving,
expediting condemnation through the "emergency situation" provisions
of Article 2 of the Eminent Domain Procedure Law if necessary.
